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Abstract 
 
This study aimed to explore the recognition of emotional and non-emotional biological 
movements in children with severe and profound deafness. 24 deaf children, together with 24 
control children matched on mental age and 24 control children matched on chronological 
age, were asked to identify a person’s actions, subjective states, emotions, and objects 
conveyed by moving point-light displays. Results showed that when observing point light 
displays, deaf children showed impairments across all conditions (emotions, actions and 
moving objects) compared to their chronological age matched controls but showed no 
differences across subjective states. The results are supportive that deaf children present 
developmental delays in their biological motion apart from the ones relative to their own 
mental state, and that this may be interpreted in relation to the expertise they have acquired in 
decoding action toward themselves. The findings are discussed in relation to deaf children 
viewing motion stimuli very differently to hearing children (e.g. Bosworth & Dobkins, 2002).   
 
Deficits in emotional and social interactions have been widely reported in deaf children (Kusché, Garfield, & Greenberg, 
1983; Vernon & Greenberg, 1999; Wauters & Knoors, 2007, Weisel & Bar-Lev, 1992). Since the development of linguistic skills 
and socio-emotional competences have been closely linked (e.g., Malle, 2002), these deficits have been consistently attributed to 
delays in language acquisition and/or reduced opportunities to converse about personal experiences with other people (e.g., 
Peterson & Siegal, 1995; 1998).  
Among the social impairments documented in deaf populations are problems in understanding other people’s emotions 
(e.g., Rieffe & Terwogt, 2000). These difficulties have often been interpreted as Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits, thereby 
implicating a lack of awareness of other people’s mental states. Deficits in ToM abilities have been most commonly reported in 
congenitally deaf children of hearing parents who have not been exposed to sign language (Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998, 
Remmel & Peters, 2008, Russell et al., 1998, Steeds, Rowe & Dowker, 1997) suggesting an early and specific need for 
interactions with a native speaker. Indeed deficits in ToM abilities have also been observed in late-signing deaf children (Peterson 
& Slaughter, 2006). Given that the ability to understand emotions is related to measures of social competence (Custrini & 
Feldman, 1989), ratings of peer popularity and likeability (Denham, McKinley, Couchoud, & Holt, 1990), and academic 
achievement scores (Nowicki & Duke, 1992), questions about the ways that deaf children access emotion information are 
important. 
Experimental studies into social abilities in deaf populations have emphasized delays in understanding other people’s 
emotions (e.g., Dyck, Farrugia, Shochet & Holmes-Brown, 2004).  However to date, studies testing facially expressed emotions in 
the deaf have produced equivocal findings. Early studies indicated that deaf children do make more errors in recognising facial 
expressions of emotion than hearing children and deficits are greater in those with pre-lingual than post-lingual hearing loss 
(Bachara, Raphael & Phelan, 1980; Schiff, 1973).  However, in later studies where deaf and hearing children were presented with 
simple emotion recognition tasks that involved emotion matching, group differences did not emerge (Hosie, Gray, Russell, Scott 
& Hunter, 1998).   
It is noteworthy that the majority of research studies that have addressed questions about emotion recognition abilities in 
deaf populations have relied on photographic, thus static, representations of facial expressions (e.g., Dyck et al., 2004). However 
dynamic faces have been argued to give a more accurate measure of performance as it is similar to what we experience in 
everyday life whereas static faces may underestimate a person’s ability to recognise emotions (Moore, 2001). The motion in 
dynamic faces provides independent information about emotional expression that is not available in posed static faces (Hill & 
Johnston, 2001) and research has shown that recognition and discrimination of emotions is superior in dynamic compared to static 
displays (e.g., Bould & Morris, 2008; Werhle et al., 2000). 
Whilst it is clear that expressions of emotion are powerfully conveyed by faces, movement of body parts are also important 
as both context and gestures provide vital sources from which we derive emotional meanings (e.g., Clarke, Bradshaw, Field, 
Hampson, & Rose, 2005; Pollick, Hill, Calder, & Paterson, 2003). For example, when point-lights are attached to the joints of an 
invisible moving human in a dark room, the visual system can rapidly and reliably distinguish these from similar motion patterns 
that do not emanate from human beings (e.g., Johansson, 1973).  Indeed, a number of studies have shown that complex 
information, such as emotions, desires, intentions, and dispositions, expressed by a single person or mutual agents can be reliably 
conveyed using point light cues (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007; Chouchourelou, Toshihiko, Harber & Shiffrar, 2006; Clarke, Bradshaw, 
Field, Hampson & Rose, 2005). Whilst sensitivity to point-light displays substantially increases during the first 5 years of life 
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(Pavlova, Kragelch-Mann, Sokolov & Birbaumer, 2001), evidence suggests that such abilities are visible at the earliest stages in 
perceptual development (e.g., Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994) and may be implicated in the development of non-verbal social 
communication skills (Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, Morgan, 1996).   
For individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, recognition of emotional expression from body gesture would appear to be 
vital. However, relatively little is known about the extent to which deaf children utilize such cues. One recent strand of research 
has provided evidence that deaf children adopt alternative perceptual strategies to hearing children. For example, they rely more 
heavily on motion cues whilst gauging when to cross a busy road (Bosworth & Dobkins, 2002) and when comprehending critical 
linguistic information in the hand movements of British sign language (Corina et al., 2007). It is surprising, given both the 
importance of motion for emotion understanding, and findings suggesting atypical motion processing in deaf children, that motion 
processing in communication domains has not been widely studied in this population.  
Evidence supporting the benefit of using motion cues to improve understanding of socio-emotional content has been 
investigated in other clinical populations, including autism spectrum disorders (ASD). This work has built on earlier findings 
showing deficits in ToM and emotional face-processing (e.g., Celani, Battacchi & Arcidiacono, 1999). The study, carried out by 
Parron et al. (2008) investigated action and emotion interpretation using point light displays (PLD) in children with ASD. These 
findings revealed a dissociation with impaired performance relative to age and intelligence matched controls on PLDs with 
emotional value, but no impairment relative to controls, on PLDs depicting simple personal actions, subjective states and objects. 
These findings were consistent with previous studies showing a selective impairment in interpreting PLDs with emotional content 
in autism (Hubert et al., 2007; Moore, Hobson & Lee, 1997).   
As previous studies into emotion recognition in deaf children have largely utilised static representations of faces, the nature 
of the emotion processing deficit is currently unclear. In order to capitalize on their proven strengths in motion processing 
(Bosworth & Dobkins, 2002; Corina et al., 2007), we adopted the methods used by Parron et al. (2008) and used PLDs to test the 
assumption of a global emotion-processing deficit in deaf children.  Point lights techniques have been used previously with deaf 
populations to assess how sign language influences action processing (Knapp, Cho & Corina, 2008).  In Knapp et al., study, adult 
deaf signers and hearing non-signers were asked to detect signed and pantomimic point-light movements that were embedded in a 
field of white noise dots. Whilst the hearing non-signers found it harder to detect differences in sign movements than in 
pantomimic movements, deaf subjects showed a similar pattern of performance across the two conditions. This difference 
suggests that deaf participants—compared to hearing participants—do not differentiate signs from other nonlinguistic gestures.     
 In the current study, children with severe or profound hearing difficulties, and hearing controls were tested on their ability 
to recognize a person’s actions, subjective states, emotions, and objects conveyed by moving point-light displays. The study 
aimed to ascertain whether children with severe or profound hearing loss recognize basic human actions represented by PLDs and 
to determine whether discrimination performance is influenced by the emotional content of the displays.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 24 children with severe or profound bilateral, congenital deafness. The sample included 10 boys and 14 
girls, aged between 6 years 8 months and 16 years and 10 months (mean age = 13 years 3 months, SD = 3 years 1 month). All of 
these participants attended mainstream schools with units specializing in the education of hearing impaired children. Of these 24 
children, eleven were profoundly deaf (hearing loss > 90 db) and 13 were severely deaf (hearing loss > 70 db). None had known 
associated medical disorders at the time of testing and visual examination was found to be normal. Neuropsychological evaluation 
was conducted by means of the Standard Progressive Raven Matrices (Raven, Raven & Court, 1992) (range 67-123, mean score = 
83.1, SD = 14.8). Mental age scores (mean mental age = 9 years 3 months, SD = 2 years 4 months) were derived from scores on 
the Standard Progressive Raven Matrices. The children were matched on non-verbal ability as deaf children are thought to rely 
more heavily on nonverbal cues in the development of emotions.  Further justification for matching children using scores derived 
from the Raven Matrices, is provided by Albanese et al., (2010) who found nonverbal intelligence to exert an effect on improving 
children’s emotion understanding. 
Two groups of typically developing children also participated in the study. The children were recruited via state schools 
and class teachers, who assisted in participant recruitment, were asked to nominate children of average intellectual ability.  None 
of these children had overt physical handicap, learning difficulties or known neurological/psychiatric deficits and all had normal 
to corrected vision and normal audition. The 24 children in the first comparison group were individually matched to the children 
in the deaf group for gender and mental age scores (MA-matched, aged from 4 years 3 months to 13 years 4 months: mean 
chronological age = 9 years 5 months, SD = 2 years 1 month). In addition to gender, the 24 children in the second comparison 
group were individually matched to the children in the deaf group for chronological age (CA-matched, aged from 6 years 4 
months to 17 years, mean chronological age = 12 years 5 months, SD = 2 years 4 months). This matching procedure has been 
adopted in a number of published studies using PLDs (e.g., Parron et al., 2008; Hubert et al., 2007) and allows interpretation of 
results in terms of developmental delay and/or developmental deviance. By comparing with a CA-match group, any individual 
differences found in deaf children would suggest developmental delay. In contrast, if deaf children are found to be different than 
both MA and CA then this difference can be accounted for by atypical deviance in that behavior (Hodapp, Burack & Zigler, 1990; 
Leonard, 1998). 
Biological Interpretation in Deaf   3 
 
 
Materials  
Tasks and stimuli were chosen to replicate the procedures initially used in Moore et al. (1997, Experiments 2 and 3) and 
further replicated in both Hubert et al., 2007 and Parron et al., 2008). Stimuli were video clips each of 5 seconds duration. They 
showed dynamic point-lights displays of a male actor performing 14 actions. There were also a further 5 control stimuli of 
manipulated PLDs of everyday objects: a ball rotating, a pair of kitchen balance scales moving as a weight was added, an ironing 
board being opened and closed, a dustpan and brush sweeping, and a saw in action. In each case 10 reflective point lights were 
distributed across the object in a manner that meant the object was not recognizable from a still image. There were also five clips 
of the actor displaying subjective states – actions that reflect an underlying state such as itchiness or tiredness – and five clips of 
the actor depicting emotional actions – happy, angry etc. (complete list of the video clips is given in Table 1). By using the same 
stimuli used in previous research, it allowed us to be able to compare our results, stimuli without any emotion compared to those 
with emotional valence (emotion, subjective states) reflexive versus non reflexive. The action condition is larger to reflect that the 
action repertoire is thought to be much bigger than both the emotional and the subjective state ones. 
Table 1: The Point Light Display sequences. 
CONDITION  
Action Lifting/hopping/kicking/jumping (both, right foot, left 
foot/pushing/digging 
Sitting/Climbing/Running/Clapping/shooting a ball/ 
Subjective States Itchy/Bored/Tired/Cold/Hurt 
Emotional States Surprised/Sad/Frightened/Angry/Happy 
Object Ball rotating/Kitchen scales moving as weights added/Iron board 
opened up and closed/Dust pan and brush sweeping/ Saw in action. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were individually tested, in a quiet classroom located in the school or day care centre. They were seated in 
front of a computer screen at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Participants were asked to watch the movies and to describe what was 
happening. Participants were told that they were going to be presented with short movies and that they were going to be asked to 
communicate orally or through sign what they had seen. All responses were recorded by the experimenter who was an 
experienced signer (although not fluent). However a teaching assistant fluent in sign was also present during these sessions to 
ensure that the children understood the tasks and that the children’s responses were reported correctly. Responses were scored as 
correct when participants accurately captured the object, the action, the state or the emotion portrayed by the PLDs or provided a 
sign that approximated the action or state.  It is important to note that responses were also considered as correct when participant 
provided a synonymous word that indicated the object, the action, the state or the emotion captured by the PLDs. In the emotion 
condition, responses were scored as correct if they captured the emotional experience. Each participant completed a total of 29 
trials: 14 in the Action condition) 5 in the Subjective states condition, 5 in the Emotional states condition, and 5 in the Object 
condition. The order of trials presentation was randomized for each subject. 
Results 
Performance accuracy across conditions 
A 3 x 4 ANOVA with Group (Deaf, MA-matched, CA-matched) as a between-subjects factor and Condition (actions, 
subjective states, emotions, objects) as a within-subjects factor was conducted using the mean accuracy rates as the dependent 
variable. This analysis revealed a main effect of Group, F(2, 69) = 5.19, MSE = .90, p < .01, η2=.13. Tukey Post-hoc analyses 
indicated that deaf participants produced significantly more errors than CA-matched (mean difference = .43, p < .01) but no 
difference compared to MA-matched participants (mean difference = .26, p=.14) and there was no difference in accuracy between 
MA- and CA-matched participants (mean difference = 0.18, p = .41). Means and standard deviations for the different 
experimental conditions are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Mean Accuracy (%) and SD (in italic) across the four conditions 
 Action Emotion Subjective Objects 
Deaf 64.8 (11.7) 50.00 (18.7) 60 (26.4) 14.2 (19.1) 
CA 80.6 (11.9) 64.2 (33.8) 65.8 (21.7) 40 (24.3) 
MA 73.5 (18.9) 58.3 (33.8) 55.8 (29.5) 39.2 (30.9) 
 
This analysis also showed a main effect of Condition, F(3, 207) = 48.76, MSE = .31, p < .001, η2=.41, with better 
performance in the action compared to the other three conditions (Emotion: mean difference = .31, p < .001; Subjective state:  
mean difference = .237, p < .005;  Object: mean difference = 1.059, p < .001). There was no difference in accuracy between the 
emotion and the subjective state conditions (mean difference = .073, p = .46) but there were fewer errors in the emotion and 
subjective states compared to the object condition (respectively, mean difference = .75, p < .001, mean difference = .82, p < .001).  
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Importantly, there was a significant group by condition interaction (F (6, 207) = .2.53, MSE = .31, p < .05, η2=.07). The 
interaction was analyzed using post-hoc Tukey tests. These analyses revealed that for the action condition the deaf group obtained 
significantly lower scores than CA-matched controls (mean difference = .40, p < .001) and the MA-matched controls (mean 
difference = .22, p < .05). On the object condition they were significantly less accurate than both the CA- (mean difference = .74, 
p < .001) and the MA-matched controls (mean difference = .75, p < .001). For the emotion condition they were marginally less 
accurate than the CA matched controls (mean difference = .47, p = .05), but not the MA-matched controls (mean difference = .16, 
p = .51). Finally, the deaf participants scores on the subjective condition did not differ from those of the CA (mean difference = 
.15, p = .48) or the MA-matched controls (mean difference = .07, p = .75).   
Because of the marginal difference in the emotion condition and the apparent large difference in the standard deviations 
between the groups, a Levene’s test (Tabacknick & Fidell, 2001) for homogeneity of variances was performed. Due to a violation 
in the homogeneity of variance, a correction for the degrees of freedom was applied for the four types of stimuli. Results revealed 
that for the action condition, deaf children’s scores were significantly lower than those of CA and MA children (t (42.21) = 4.6, p 
< .001 and t (36.58) = 2.14, p < .05, respectively). On the emotion condition, deaf children were significantly less accurate than 
CA, (t (30.25) = 2.18, p < .05), but not MA matched children, (t (30.47) = .74, p < .47). Deaf children’s scores were significantly 
lower on the objects condition than CA, (t (45.84) = 3.93, p < .001), and MA matched children, (t (43) = 3.49, p < .001). Finally, 
for the subjective states, the results revealed no significant differences between deaf and CA or MA groups (t (43.90) = .77, p = 
.45 and t (45.40) = .30, p = .77), respectively. Importantly, the scores for the CA and MA control groups did not differ across any 
of the conditions: action (mean difference = .18, p = .20), emotion (mean difference = .31, p = .39), subjective (mean difference = 
.21, p = .56) and object (mean difference = .003, p = .99). 
Effect of age on performance levels 
To evaluate the contribution of age to accuracy across the four motion conditions, hierarchical multiple regressions were 
carried out separately between the deaf and their mental age matched controls and another between the deaf children and their 
chronological age matched controls.  Each of the motion conditions was used as a dependent variable with age and group (deaf 
and MA/deaf and CA) as the independent variables. An age x group interaction was entered as a second step in to the regression. 
The groups were coded (Deaf =0 and CA=1) in the first regression and (Deaf=0 and MA=1) in the second one. The standard 
regression coefficients are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Standard Regression Coefficients 
 
Deaf and Chronological Age Deaf and Mental Age 
Age Group Age x Group Age Group Age x Group 
Action .37*** .49*** -.09 .58*** .47*** .93* 
Emotion .03 .25 .51 .43** .31* 2.02*** 
Subjective .17 .09 .33 .35* .043 .95 
Object .18 .48*** -.002 .43*** .59*** 1.07* 
NA  *p<.05  **p<.01 ***p<.001 
The results revealed that for the deaf and CA, only performance for action was predicted by increasing age. Performance 
on both the action and object conditions was predicted by group with the deaf performing comparatively poorer than the CA 
across both conditions.   
Importantly for the deaf children and MA, age predicted performance in all conditions with the children showing better 
performance with increasing age. Group also predicted performance for each of the conditions, except for the subjective condition. 
Deaf children were poorer than MA across each of the other three conditions. There were also significant interactions between age 
and group in all but the subjective conditions, showing that age had a different pattern on performance in the deaf children 
compared to the MA controls. Further regression analyses revealed that in the action condition, age significantly predicted 
performance in the MA (β =.67, p < .001) and the deaf (β =-.51, p<.05).  However whilst in MA group, the older the children the 
better their performance, this effect was reversed for the deaf group whereby the older children got progressively poorer in the 
action condition. In the object condition, age significantly predicted performance in the MA (β =.63, p < .001) but this effect was 
not found for the deaf children (β =.27, p =.21).  The same pattern was shown in the emotion condition, age significantly predicted 
performance in the MA (β =.79, p < .001) but this effect was not found for the deaf children (β =-.07, p =.74). Thus age appears to 
have a more powerful effect upon performance in the MA group compared to the deaf group. Therefore, regardless of the 
inclusion of a much younger age MA control group, these children performed better than their older deaf counterparts.  Thus, 
when controlling for intelligence, clear differences are observed across deaf and hearing children with the deaf consistently poorer 
on the biological motion task. 
Degree of hearing loss and signing ability 
In order to further uncover factors implicated in successful task performance in the deaf participants, we carried out further 
analyses (ANOVA). The first of these showed that there was no effect of severity of hearing loss on error rate, (F (1,23) = .10, p = 
.75).  As research has shown that deaf children with signing family members perform as well as age and intelligence matched 
hearing children on emotion recognition and theory of mind tasks (Courtin, 2000; Peterson & Siegal, 1999); we compared the 
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total numbers of correct scores, obtained by the twelve deaf children who had signing family members (aged 6 years 9 months-15 
years 8 months: mean = 10 years 3 months, SD = 3.4) with those obtained by the twelve children without signing family members 
(aged 6 years 8 months-16 years 10 months: mean = 12 years 4 months, SD = 2.4).  This included 7 families where only the 
mother signed and 4 where both parents signed.  5 out of the 12 families were learning BSL level 1 and the remaining 8 had 
completed BSL level 3. Only one child has non hearing parents and in this case both the mother and father were profoundly deaf. 
The analysis failed to show any significant differences (F (2, 23) = .51, p = .61). We then compared scores for the thirteen deaf 
children who preferred to communicate using sign language (aged 6 years 8 months-15 years 8 months: mean = 10 years 2 
months, SD = 3.20) with those of the eleven deaf children who preferred to communicate orally (aged 7 years 8 months-16 years 
10 months: mean = 12 years 8 months, SD = 2.53). Again, this comparison did not reveal any significant difference (F (1, 23) = 
.21, p = .65). 1 
Discussion 
The findings from the study showed that whilst deaf and hearing children matched for mental and chronological age did 
not differ in their ability to identify subjective states from point light displays, identification of emotions, actions and objects were 
significantly impaired in the deaf group. In comparison to the MA-matched control group their performance scores on the object 
and action condition were significantly lower and in comparison with their CA-matched control group their scores were 
significantly lower across emotions, actions and objects conditions. Therefore, deaf children were poorer across most of the 
experimental conditions, providing additional support that deaf children may actually view motion stimuli very differently to 
hearing children (e.g. Bosworth & Dobkins, 2002). Deaf children differ from hearing children in detecting visual cues for objects 
and actions as well as their ability to decode subtle visual cues for emotions.  
This difference in levels of performance across experimental conditions in the deaf group did not simply reflect changes in 
levels of difficulty across conditions. Consistent with findings from earlier studies (Hubert et al., 2007; Parron et al., 2008) our 
results from the hearing controls showed that children’s performance was poorest on the object condition whilst performing best 
on the action condition. Whilst the deaf participants showed the same pattern, their scores were nevertheless poorer than those of 
controls especially in the action condition. 
Performance of the deaf children across the emotion condition was consistent with previous research showing that deaf 
children exhibit difficulties in emotion recognition (e.g., Dyck, Farrugia, Shochet & Holmes-Brown, 2004). The deaf children 
showed poorer performance across the emotion conditions compared to CA. However the findings fail to support our hypothesis 
speculating that motion may significantly enhance emotion identification ability in the deaf (e.g. Hill & Johnston, 2001). Static 
representations (e.g. photographs) of emotional stimuli provide relatively impoverished information about social situations.  
Indeed, work carried out with hearing populations, have observed increased recognition of emotions when test stimuli are 
dynamic (Bould & Morris, 2008) and yet this was not observed in the deaf group.  
Problems in understanding other people’s emotions (e.g., Rieffe & Terwogt, 2000) have often been interpreted in the 
context of lack of Theory of Mind. Findings from studies testing these mentalizing abilities in deaf participants have reported 
deficits (e.g., Rieffe & Terwogt, 2000), and these may provide evidence for a deficit at the social cognitive level (Tager-Flusberg 
& Sullivan, 2000). However whilst the results found the deaf children to identify fewer emotions from the point light displays,  no 
differences were found across subjective states between the deaf children and the two control groups. This double dissociation 
between emotions and subjective emotions may reflect deaf childrens’ ability to have a better understanding of their own emotions 
but a specific difficulty in the understanding of the emotions of others. For example, Rieffe & Terwogt (2000) found when 
looking at spontaneous use of mental states in explaining other people’s emotions, that 6 and 10 year old deaf children’s 
references to desires exceeded their hearing peers and were even found to increase with age. One interpretation of better self 
awareness is that the deaf children may concentrate on the expression and understanding of their own desires in order to make 
effective use of their interaction time to ensure that others unambiguously understand their wants. Therefore, understanding one’s 
own emotion appears to remain intact in deaf children. 
An unresolved but important question is whether the deaf children scored at a lower level across the biological motion task 
compared to their matched controls due to their deafness per se, such that their auditory deprivation is responsible for motion 
deficits through limited ability to communicate with others (e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998), or whether experience with sign 
language played a role.  A limitation to the current study is that all deaf children were signers, and there was found to be no 
differences between the deaf children who favored communicating orally compared to those who favored sign. Therefore, these 
results cannot be interpreted in terms of whether level of signing ability in deaf children affects the ability to decode emotional 
and non-emotional content. In the deaf literature key differences have often been observed in children exposed to sign from birth 
(e.g. Emmorey & McCullough, 2009) but only one child in the present study was a native signer, thus preventing further 
conclusions to be drawn on the experience of sign. Future studies need to address both native signers and hearing signers in order 
to unravel this question. 
                                                          
1 A post-hoc power analysis using G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996), revealed a small to medium size effect 
(.37) using the conventions proposed by Cohen (1977). Analysis also revealed that the probability of finding this power (1 – β) = 
.97. 
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Another important question is how the four motion conditions relate to each other. Pelphrey, Adolphs and Morris (2004) 
have suggested that different aspects of social perception are subserved by different, specialized brain systems and that perception 
of bodily motion relies on one such specialized system. Frith and Frith (1999) have further suggested that the ability to mentalise 
may have evolved from a system for representing actions in the brain. For example the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is 
hypothesised to be a perception-action matching system that is automatically engaged during the observation of both 
communicative and non-communicative gestures and actions. In addition, areas outside the MNS such as the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS) are also involved in the perception of biological motion and more broadly in processing social communication (e.g., 
Grossman et al., 2002). Visual regions including the fusiform face area (FFA) and the extrastriate body area (EBA) are also 
recruited during the perception of gestures and actions involving the hands, arms and face (Mortgomery & Haxby, 2008).  
Importantly, linguistic articulators for sign language are the same as those involved in everyday human actions, such as 
reaching, grasping, object manipulation and communicative gesture. Different experiences with manual communication might 
then alter the nature of the neural systems that underlie action for deaf signers (Corina et al., 2007) and thus differences in any 
system representing actions may lead to problems in social perception including Theory of Mind. Whilst problems in 
understanding other people’s emotions have often been attributed directly to deaf children’s lack of opportunity to converse it is 
possible that this may in fact be more specific to children signing experience. This then implies that experience using a visual 
language shifts neural processing of human actions (Corina, & Knapp, (2008); Knapp, Cho, & Corina, (2008); Knapp, & Corina, 
(2010).  
Given that neural mechanisms specialized for the perception of biological activity appear to play an important role in social 
perception (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000; Wheaton, Pipinges, Siberstein & Puce, 2001) studies using biological motion 
paradigms will be important in enabling researchers to address outstanding questions about the role of action perception in deaf 
individuals. Whilst deafness alone is thought to enhance certain aspects of an individual’s visual attention (see Bavelier, Dye & 
Hauser, 2006), specifically deafness causes an individual to allocate more attention to the visual periphery and be more sensitive 
to motion on the periphery, effects of competency in a visual language may also enhance some cognitive functions (Emmorey & 
Kosslyn, 1996). 
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